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HYBRIDS, RIGHTS AND THEIR PROLIFERATION
Lynda Birke and Mike Michael
Introduction
Working out the concept of rights is a complicated business, which at
least keeps philosophers occupied. Not so long ago, one of us would
have been denied the right to vote, on the grounds of her gender. Yet
now, at the turn of the millennium, she is far from sure that we have
come very far on the question of women's rights. And if women, or
minorities, or anyone else who is human can sometimes be denied rights,
then how much more likely that non-humans will be?
Yet extending the concept of rights to non-human animals is increasingly
being taken seriously. It is debated in academic journals, and forms the
basis for a growing activism. The publication of books arguing in favour
of extending rights to at least some animals has proliferated.1 But the
idea also has its critics. Some criticisms come from those who simply
wish to keep nonhuman animals out of any moral or political agenda.2
The starting point of this article is the critique of the idea of rights, from
the perspective of those who are animal advocates3; in particular, we
start from the premise that the concept of 'rights' is too rooted in
idealisation of the individual and autonomy. Such idealisation can be
found in claims about nonhuman animals. But, we would argue, this
marginalises any concept of relationality. In discussing relationality, we
aim to address the ways in which relations between human and
nonhuman animals are embedded in broader networks of inter-relations
(that range from the evolutionary to the local and cultural). Those
relations are also a product of the heterogeneous forms of
communication between individual human and animal, especially in the
case of companion animals.
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We want, however, to do more than simply acknowledge relationality;
we also want to suggest that it can serve as another basis for warranting,
advocating, particular positive relationships with animals. That is to say,
we aim to provide a narrative - contrasted to that of 'rights' - that
prioritises our interrelations with animals in such a way that to harm
'them' would be to harm 'ourselves'. So, while we might be sympathetic
to studies of the human-animal relationship, we would see these as
assuming from the outset discrete humans and animals, whereas we are
aiming to reach a position where we can 'assume at outset' the
relationality of humans and animals.4
What we want to pursue here is the question of relationality. Other
authors have noted the importance of relationships and contexts. Ted
Benton for example, argues that the social context of both human and
nonhuman cannot be ignored, while Freya Matthews insists that we
recognise the commensality of humans and nonhumans.5 We, Matthews
points out, need animal company; but nature - animals- can benefit from
our company, too. This is not to deny the existence of appalling abuses
of animals, she argues, but rather acknowledges the mutuality of many
human/animal interactions. Similarly Barbara Noske6 argues that our
society is partly based on its relation to, and exploitation of, animals. In
this paper, we draw upon a quite different literature: we turn to recent
work in the sociology of scientific knowledge as a starting point. In
particular, we draw on the work of Bruno Latour, and his analyses of
'hybrids'.7 We extend this idea to thinking about two examples of human
relationship and communication with companion animals - with dogs,
and with horses. These relationships, we argue, can be thought about as
instances of hybrids, a concept that sees them as more than the sum of
the parts. We argue that thinking in terms of hybrids of
human/nonhuman can be useful in enabling us to move beyond some of
the problems of individualism that beset debates about rights.
In doing so, we are not making claims for all nonhuman animals
(although others might wish to extend the analysis further); indeed, we
offer this paper very much as a preliminary exploration. Nor are we
seeking to undermine the spirit of animal rights philosophy. On the
contrary, we are committed to it, but do not find it enough.
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Right is Wrong?
There have been a number of critics of the philosophy of animal rights indeed, of the concept of rights more generally. Perhaps one of the
strongest criticisms is that notions of rights rely on a profound separation
and individuality, as well as prioritising rationality. Benton8 notes, for
instance, the basis of our understanding, and the idealisation of certain
rights in the eighteenth century. He points out that while freedom from
arrest, and freedom of association were specified, the rights of health,
bodily integrity, nutrition, and so on, were not. This was, moreover, the
period of history when our modern separation of nature from culture was
consolidated; it was the sphere of the 'natural' that was omitted from
these idealised rights - the needs of the body, and the nonhuman world.
Additionally, Benton reminds us of the ways that notions of rights tend
to obscure 'the social-relational preconditions' for the emergence of the
'human individual' as bearer of rights, and with particular qualities,
attributes and abilities 'in virtue of which they are held to have inherent
value'.9 'Rights', resting as they do upon some version of individualism,
neglect the many ways in which our experiences are situated.10
Another point needs to be made. The ideas concerning rights have
'acquired an exaggerated importance as part of the prestige of the public
sphere and the masculine, and the emphasis on separation and autonomy,
on reason and abstraction'.11 Separation and autonomy are defined,
against others - be they nonhuman animals, an ill-defined 'nature', or
particular excluded groups of human others. It is through this process of
exclusion against, that feminism becomes linked to environmental and
animal causes: women, nature and nonhuman animals can, in different
ways and at different times, become others to the story of separation.
Plumwood argues instead for a form of relationality, which, she reminds
us, is not the same as the identification with nature sometimes implied in
writing about deep ecology (too close an identification may blind us to
understanding an other's suffering).12 Nonhuman animals have their own
societies, but they are also - deeply - in relationship with other animal
kinds, including humans. In different ways, they are in relationship to
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human societies (although there is a world of difference between the
'domestic animals', socialised into human societies, and the relationship
of a wild species to humanity).
Relations with nonhumans: Introducing Hybrids
The word 'hybrid' has many meanings. It can denote a deliberately bred
cross between, say, two plant species; it might conjure up 'hybrid vigour'.
Or, it might carry meanings of illicit mixtures, or something defiled by
being less pure.
The sense of 'hybrid' that we use here draws on the notion of hybrid
introduced by Bruno Latour, in his work on technoscience. In a recent
book, Bruno Latour describes what he considers to be two practices
central to modernity. On the one hand, there is 'translation', which
'creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature
and culture'.13 On the other, there is also 'purification', the process by
which we keep humans separated off from nonhumans. Modern Western
culture tends towards the latter, even while busily creating new mixtures
(sometimes literally, as in the case of genetically engineered organisms).
One problem with the animal rights position, following Latour, is that the
concept of rights, while apparently denying separation from other animal
kinds is firmly rooted in it. All it seems to do is to move the goalposts, to
allow some kinds of animals onto the pitch. Life, meanwhile, is awfully
crowded in the stands and onlookers are policed to stop them invading.
But it is precisely because of that history of purification that the practice
of sociology or anthropology has ignored all else but human-human
relationships.14 Not surprisingly then, we are unused to thinking about
all the nonhuman things that contribute to our world, forming chains of
associations (that are both material and semiotic) with humans and other
nonhumans. These are part of our social organisation, behind-the-scenes
contributors - though of course 'social' becomes a misnomer in this
context for what we see are 'orderings'15 made up of heterogeneous
elements. Expanding on this idea, Bruno Latour makes the point that
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We are never faced with objects or social relations, we
are faced with chains which are associations of humans (H)
and nonhumans (NH). No-one has ever seen a social relation
by itself...nor a technical relation...Instead we are
always faced with chains which look like this H-NH-H-NH-HNH...16
The 'nonhuman' here may mean a technical artefact; thus, our
communication with you, the reader, depends upon technological
relationships, a complex array of computers, software, and international
institutions. But, we want to argue, 'nonhuman' can also mean nonhuman
animals.
Breaking the boundaries of what counts as human usually results in a
rush to demonstrate the ways in which animals are not rational, are not
self-aware, are not intelligent, and so on. Separating ourselves off from
'nature' characterises the modern period, Latour argues. But the study of
society or culture has itself developed out of that separation, and it
specifically excludes all nonhuman influence - be that inanimate or
animate. Animals, plants, technical artefacts - all belong to the realm of
the nonsocial; they can be left to be studied by people (scientists) who
themselves deny the existence of the social in the descriptions they
themselves make of the nonsocial. Yet isn't the existence of 'society'
itself crossing the boundary, depending as it does on much more than
merely human-human relationships?
Latour's work rests on actor-network theory. Put briefly, this seeks to
map out complex networks of humans and nonhumans. The world of
actor-network theory is partly ruled by the generalized 'principle of
symmetry' that Bruno Latour and Michel Callon17 have advocated. In
essence, this principle rejects any a priori distinctions between the
human and the nonhuman, agent and object, the social and the natural or
the technological (such distinctions are all too often simply assumed,
they point out). Thus, what is to count as 'human' or 'natural' or
'technological' is a matter of struggle between various actors such as
scientists, policy makers, lay publics and the like. One relevant example
of this would be current debates about the moral status of the great apes;
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there is ongoing political struggle over whether they might be 'counted'
as animals (part of nature) or at least partly be admitted to the realm of
the human.18
It is, then, a matter of empirical investigation as to what has emerged as
'natural', 'artificial' or 'cultural'. More recently, Latour has elaborated this
view19 to argue that human and nonhumans alike are interfused with all
manner of nonhumans and humans (the network). Such heterogeneity is
characteristic of the modern condition (indeed, all conditions). Despite
our best modernist efforts at denying the 'exchange of properties'
between - that is, purifying - humans and nonhumans, this heterogeneous
process of mingling continues apace. What makes this theory different
from many others is its insistence that nonhuman - technological and
'natural' - are present in the production of every 'ordering' of relations.
We are always comprising hybrids, temporary or less temporary
associations with a vast array of nonhumans.
So, if we are to describe a person's relationship to her dog in these terms,
then we must speak not only of the human-and-the-dog, but also of the
other 'allies' that influence that relationship. Whatever other networks she
engages in, Lynda is also 'enrolled' into certain networks by the dogs she
lives with. This includes the dogleads and their manufacturers (see
below), the producers of dog food, dog beds and canine distemper
vaccine, veterinary surgeons - not to mention the resident cat. To put it in
terms of hybrids: the hybrid 'Lynda-dog-lead-dog' is constituted through
and depends upon these various networks. This, of course, is no different
from the production of 'human individuals' who are an effect of those
networks that poststructuralists have deconstructed. We shall return to
the nature of these networks below.
Relationalities and Animals
There has recently been an upsurge in writing about the 'human-animal
relationship'. New books and journals appear, marking this out as a new
area of study. That focus is certainly welcome, and makes a refreshing
change from the assumption that animals are completely separate from
us. Yet, perusing the contents of those journals is sometimes
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disappointing. What we find are examples of animals bringing benefits to
humans, in hospitals, in our homes, to children, to disabled people.
Some articles may tell us of how human contact can benefit animals
(usually companion animals); but very few speak of the relationship
between the two. In what follows, we will explore two examples in order
to explicate this 'relationality'. But before we embark upon this, a little
theoretical gloss is in order, if only to clarify what we are attempting to
do as we switch registers from the local (personal) interactions between
humans and animals to evolutionary relations.
What is a human? The production of humans relies on particular
techniques, practices, discourses - what Rose20 calls 'subjectifying
technologies'. These include what Rose refers to as the psy disciplines
(psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis), though many
other practices and technologies also shape 'the human'. The psy
disciplines, for example, help to give coherence to the notion of a unitary
individual, as well as contributing to the values and interests that are
invested in such a figure.
What we are attempting here, albeit tentatively, is to do something
similar for another character - the human-animal hybrid. So, rather than
accept the ideas of individualism and rights, we can write a different
story, that contributes to a concept of human-nonhuman hybridity. We
could begin, for instance, by pointing to how this figure/character/actor
is grounded in, and emerges out of, the evolutionary history of
domestication, or to various pre- and pro-scriptions regarding how such
human/nonhuman hybrids should behave.
If we thus begin by assuming human/animal relationality - or the
existence of the hybrid - then we can speak in terms of the co-production
and mutual emergence of humans and animals. To discriminate against
the latter, becomes akin to discriminating against the former, for these,
indeed, cannot be separated. With this overview in mind, let us proceed
with storying our hybrid.
Speaking for - or otherworldly conversations?
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Animal companions, or pets, have long been known to have therapeutic
effects upon their owners. In particular, owners claim that 'their animals
are sensitive to their (the owners') moods and feelings'.21 The processes
of communication that are evident here are clearly not linguistic, but
vocal, visual and tactile. However, animals' lack of linguistic ability may
be one of their prime assets in that animals cannot, as a consequence
judge, betray or criticise - their feelings for the human are apparently
uncontingent. But this intimacy does not preclude humans from 'speaking
for' their animal companions. As Sanders notes:
Because the animal is 'mute', caretakers often find
themselves in situations in which they must 'speak for'
their nonhuman companions. In so doing, they make use of
a rich body of knowledge derived from an intimate
understanding of the animal-other built up in the course of
day-to-day interactional experience. Dog owners commonly
give voice to what they perceive to be their animals'
mental, emotional, and physical experiences.22
Such patterns of 'speaking for' suggests a process of retelling, by humans,
of their own and animals' experiences with the aid of more or less
familiar stories. But that does not mean we should not take them
seriously.
Indeed, we would argue that there is a serious problem with a sociology
which persistently ignores animal others, for it remains rooted in the
persistent dualism of nature and culture. Many animal 'others' are deeply
integral to human societies - indeed, as Benton argues23, they are partly
constitutive of our society in many ways. But understanding this does
not mean that we have to objectify them, or even to accord them human
status (as seems to be implied in some formulations of rights). Feminist
historian of science Donna Haraway, reflecting on these issues, suggests
that:
The last thing 'they' (animals) need is human subject
status, in whatever cultural-historical form... We need
other terms of conversations with animals, a much less
respectable undertaking. The point is not new
representations, but new practices, other forms of life
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rejoining humans and nothumans.24
Out of this emerges, Haraway hopes, a new form of human being:
Once the world of subjects and objects is put into
question, that paradox concerns the congeries, or curious
confederacy, that is the self, as well as selves' relations
with others. A promising form of life, conversation defies
the autonomization of the self, as well as the
objectification of the other.24
So, what happens as we engage in those non-linguistic conversations
with animal others is a diffusion of the (human) self. The human identity
that emerges from these conversations is no longer linear, but is realised
through all forms of communication. We want to emphasise that that
process must include nonverbal communications, with nonhuman
actors.25
We might say that animals are mute only if we remain deaf. As Kath
Smart has shown26, dogbreeders believe themselves to be in conversation
with their animals, and sometimes even under scrutiny or surveillance - a
perception familiar to anyone who works closely with animals in similar
ways. That perception implies an agency, that the dogs are somehow
enrolling the humans into the association. The idea that there is coagency between (some) nonhuman animals and humans is not, of course,
new to animal trainers and breeders. But it is not part of the descriptions
of the world to be found in academic disciplines; there, the purification
of human culture - to which Latour refers - is endemic. Humans have
their own society; animals belong to the other side of a heavily policed
boundary (within the natural sciences).
But the boundaries tend to break down, as Latour emphasised (see note
7). For example, in contrast to the familiar story that humans
'domesticated' dogs in prehistory, Budiansky27 contends that animals
such as dogs 'chose' us. They were, he suggests, drawn to human
communities, to the shelter, food and protection they might offer. In that
case, the domestication of dogs 'is an evolutionary phenomenon rather
than a human invention'. Dogs, we might say, have a long history of
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enrolling humans, just as we have one with them. Both have adapted to
each other, and both are (sometimes) in deeply mutual communication.
Here, we have a story that crosses the boundary of 'natural science'
(evolution, animals) and 'sociology' (human society).
One way in which human-dog communication is manifest occurs when
we observe a person 'taking her dog for a walk'. Usually, this involves a
technological artefact - the doglead. This object, however, mediates
exchanges between the human and dog, and blurs the site of agency.
Who is the user - human or dog? Who does the configuring - animal,
lead, or human? For example, dogs may have their own agendas;
sometimes, these fit with human agendas - sometimes, they do not, as is
often the case with Lynda and her three dogs-plus-dogleads. Agency, in
that case, is a complicated business.
Dogs, indeed, may resist human desires (witness the reluctance to enter
the veterinary surgery, or the desire to jump off the table once there). But
even when they cooperate, agency is evident. In other words, dogs may
be committed to a certain 'contract' and will bring their 'handlers' into
line. But also, the fulfilment and maintenance of the contract is
continuously performed through communication, at many levels,
between human and dog.
This process of negotiation is partly conducted through the medium of
the doglead - especially so in urban areas,28 where it is the hybrid of
human-doglead-dog who must negotiate the tricky terrain. The doglead
then permits a mutuality - both human and dog look out for objects or
events on the other's behalf. In some cases, the dog's agency is more
prominent, as is the case with guide dogs. Stories abound among those
working with 'service animals' of the animal acting heroically (leaping
under the wheels of a sliding wheelchair, for instance) - agency, indeed.
We turn now to another example - that of human/horse interactions.
Again, the popular image is one of humans using and dominating horses
(as exemplified in the rather misleading phrase, to break a horse). Partly
for that reason, there are some in the animal rights movement who
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consider that it is morally wrong to ride horses. But this position again
plays down any mutuality.
Here, the 'hybrid' we might describe consists of human-bridle-horse.
Communication between the two living entities takes place partly
through the medium of the bridle or halter, and partly kinaesthetically through movement and its sensing. As with dogs, there is a continuous
subtle play of conversation: for horses are large animals and cannot be
dominated (even very small ones, like Shetland ponies, can beat puny
human strength). They will, however, agree to converse.
Now it is also true that there are many, many instances of abuse by
humans - a breaking of the contract, as it were. Such acts may, in part,
reflect a belief in domination. But to what extent can humans truly
dominate an animal, especially if it is the size of many horses? On the
contrary, 'learning to ride' means not only acquiring certain physical
skills, but also learning a new, largely tactile, language. Through that
means, we can communicate with the horse. But the horse also has
agency; it can - easily - refuse to work with us. Certainly, if a horse does
not want to go over a jump, it will not - just as it will show agency by
resistance if, say, a human mishandles the intervening technology (by
grabbing at the reins and hurting the horse's mouth).
There are certainly some among animal rights activists who believe that
it is morally wrong to 'make' horses jump obstacles - especially in
contexts where there is a risk of injury. There have, as a result, been
demonstrations at several international equestrian events. Whatever the
merits of their claim, it is somewhat ironic that demonstrations focus on
the 'showpiece' events, for it is there that the 'hybrids' are policed most
strongly. The literature of the 'horse world' relies on a rhetoric of
welfare, in which the horse's needs are paramount.29 Human-bridle-horse
hybrids must follow particular rules, at least in public arenas. To an
extent, the horse takes part in this rule-following.
Domestic animals, such as dogs and horses, are socialised into a society.
By that we mean not only their own society (the local community of dogs
at the breeders, or the horses at the stud), but also into human society.
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What we should perhaps be insisting on, indeed, is a notion of a hybrid
society, consisting of humans along with nonhumans. Just like a human
infant, a young animal must be socialised into that hybrid society: both
kinds of infants must 'learn the rules' about other members of society.
Part of the prevailing view that nonhuman animals are domesticated by
us is the claim that, underneath the veneer of domestication, there is a
'wild' animal, driven by archaic instincts. This additive view, of the thin
veneer of culture overlaying baser wildness, fails to address the social
embeddedness of domestic animals.
Yet we project our social
expectations onto domestic animals, and sometimes they behave
accordingly. For example, within the world of 'horse people' (a curiously
hybrid phrase, to be sure!), there are many humans who will avoid mares,
in the belief that they are less 'trainable'; stallions, too, are often thought
to be 'difficult'. Yet - if true - how much of that is due to human
expectations and to socialisation? If humans socialise the animal into a
role of being 'difficult' (that is, less susceptible to mutual
communication), then that is what it will become. So, too, may human
children.
Returning to the theme of animal rights, we have argued that one
important problem with rights is its emphasis on individuality, rather
than relationality. This in turn is deeply entwined with the historically
contingent separation of 'nature' from 'culture' in the West. That
separation then excludes the place of (at least some) animals in society
and culture, and their interests in maintaining that place.
The problems of the ways that animals may be treated today by humans
arise in large part from their relegation to the (inferior) world of nature.
That is not to say that prior to the modern period, animals were treated
well; they were not. But a characteristic of modernity is the deep anxiety
to police the boundaries of human culture (or even of Western culture);
as Latour puts it (note 7), we are obsessed with purification. One
manifestation of this is our constant need in the West to return nonhuman
animals to their 'place' in nature. Because of this, we tend to have
difficulties with those nonhuman animals whose place is by our sides;
are they in nature, or do they belong to culture?
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Yet the very same culture so preoccupied with purifying its boundaries
also works to transgress them. Science, for example, does both. The
practice of science assumes a separation from nature (hence the supposed
objective stance, by which scientists claim to 'know' nature, while
denying their own cultural contingencies); but simultaneously, it denies
separation (evolutionary theory and genetics) and even creates boundarycrossing organisms (hybrids and chimeras abound in the new age of
biotechnology).
Concluding Remarks
Our use of the idea of hybrids is deliberate. We are not necessarily
advocating a literal interbreeding of people and other animals (which is
another debate). Rather, we want to use the concept of hybridity for two
related reasons. The first is that the notion of a hybrid implies boundarycrossing and mixing - if not literally, then certainly at a conceptual level.
This confounds issues of what is human? or what is animal? or even
what is an individual? At the very least, that confounding should help to
destabilise that tired old division between nature and culture.
Hybrids also open up a space, secondly, to think about relationality. Now
we have used the term hybrid to emphasise the conjoint nature of the
hybrid, and its co-agency.
As critics of the nature/culture or
nature/nurture dualisms have often bewailed, it is all too easy to invoke
some kind of addition (nurture adds onto the nature base), or a simple
interaction (A can affect B, which can affect A30). But even this can still
be split apart - indeed, that splitting is often required by the very methods
by which we might study something. So, we might choose to study 'the
human/dog relationship' as a function of doggy effects on humans (such
as reduction of heart rate if you go patting a dog), or perhaps of human
effects on dogs (selective breeding, say).
Yet what is missing from, or played down by, this kind of account is the
mutuality; both human and dog become changed, and become more than
simple person-plus-dog. By trying to think about this chimerical being as
a hybrid, we want to emphasise that 'more than'. Lynda is a part of many
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human networks, but also at times comes together with dogs and horses
to create temporary hybrids: these, in turn, generate other networks of
humans and nonhumans.
One extreme position we have encountered among animal rights activists
is the idea that it is wrong to 'keep pets', that the animals should be free
to wander and to 'be themselves', that they have intrinsic rights to
freedom. But in this specific case - companion animals - such a stance
would deny their relationships with humans. It is also based on a highly
idealised notion of 'freedom', for who among us humans has such
freedom? Aren't we all constrained by, among other things, our
relationships with other beings? Invoking individual 'rights' seems to
gloss over those constraints, and to ignore the very relationality on which
we (and many nonhuman animals) base our social lives.
Now in seeking to emphasise that relationality, we recognise its
limitations when it comes to other human uses of animals. We want here
to use the idea with regard to companion animals. When it comes to
intensive farming, the rhetoric of rights is probably more politically
useful; even the more liberal welfare lobby talk about ensuring that
certain animal needs are met.
The use of animals in scientific experimentation is another area where to
insist on at least some rights may be a useful political strategy. Thus,
those involved in reform or working for welfare might argue that
laboratory animals have a right to a certain amount of space in their
living quarters. Even so, we should remember that the practice of using
animals itself seems to require that scientists' separate themselves off
from the animals, that they psychologically and culturally deny any
relationality. Indeed, on those occasions where laboratory animals
become individually incorporated into relationships with people (as 'lab
pets', say), then they usually are 'saved' from the experiments.31
Much modern theorising about evolution seems to stress individuality (or
even to shift it onto selfish genes). Thus, despite the appeal of Darwin's
ideas to those of us who see kindred spirits in the nonhuman world, we
inherit a cultural tendency towards atomism. Yet there are also
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evolutionary theorists who do not see such atomism in the natural world,
who emphasise instead the co-evolution of ecologically interrelated
species.32 Rather than seeing individual species or populations as rather
passively adapted to a (largely inert) environment, this reformulation
insists on mapping out the networks of interrelationships and effects.
Indeed, an animal's or a species' environment is constituted by other
organisms, including humans - hybrids aplenty.
And there, to return to Val Plumwood's analysis of ideas of nature, lies
the difficulty at the heart of rights theory. For while we might speak of
the 'rights' of animal A to roam free 'around its environment', that is to
ignore the 'rights' of other organisms. To take the oft-used example,
whose rights should we then heed, the sheep or the wolf?
We have borrowed here from the concepts of hybridity and actornetworks, developed in the literature on sociology of scientific
knowledge. Their relevance to a discussion of our relationship to animals
is twofold - they explicitly problematise the separation of nature from
culture, and they relocate humans individuals back into networks of other
actors including nonhumans. Whether we speak of events over
evolutionary time, or seek to describe human relationships with (certain)
animals now, any rhetoric of individualism is limited.
Instead, we must try to develop a relational framework, and to develop an
ethical stance from that. It is not necessarily in the best interests of
companion animals (at least) to talk of their individual 'rights to roam
free' (where?). Nor is it necessarily to deny them some intrinsic freedom
to follow their instincts - a belief which maintains the notion that
nonhuman animals are 'in nature' in ways that we are not.
Once we think in terms of hybrids between culturally specific humans,
nonhuman nature, and even technical artefacts (this, it should be noted,
could include ecosystems), then perhaps we can develop a language of
interests that apply to the hybrid. Among other things, hybrids are
conjoint entities: they are not simply one entity sitting alongside another.
As a consequence, hurting one part of a hybrid hurts the rest.33 Perhaps
this move will not always work to protect the interest of either humans or
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nonhumans.34 But, we want to insist, seeing individuals as bearers of
atomistic rights does not work well either, not least because it ignores
our collective social networks.
We need, to return to Donna Haraway's insights, to develop new forms of
conversation with nonhuman others, to explore and celebrate our joint
kinship.35 In so doing, our highly overdeveloped sense of selfhood
might begin to diminish; we might even allow a breaching of our
boundaries. Lest that sound too anthropocentric, nonhuman animals
stand to benefit; for their relationships with less egocentric and territorial
humans are likely to be more welcoming and communicative. To speak
of their 'rights' seems only to reinforce our own selves and boundaries.
Surely they - and we - deserve better than that?
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